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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THREE ECONOMIES: 
NAVIGATING A SPRAWLING FIELD OF STUDY, 
PRACTICE, AND SOCIETAL GOVERNANCE IN WHICH 
EVERYTHING IS CONNECTED TO EVERYTHING ELSE 
Zygmunt J.E. Plater' 
The vast sprawl of the environmental law field makes it a bemusing 
and confounding puzzle even to those who pursue it as their primary aca-
demic vocation. The amorphous breadth and intricate depths of environ-
mental law present special challenges to anyone who tries to navigate the 
field. This Article addresses several of these challenges, briefly analyzing 
how environmental curricula are designed, and then suggests a poten-
tially useful new way to conceptualize the realm of environmental law. 
A few years ago, after surveying the experiences of more than one 
hundred of his fellow environmental law teachers, Professor Joseph Sax 
ruefully concluded: 
Bewilderment and frustration were the most common themes. This 
subject seems to have overwhelmed us. Virtually every law 
teacher-however broad his or her overlook-wants to introduce 
students to the specific materials in the field, and to provide some 
experience and familiarity with it. Yet, every such attempt is an en-
counter with statutes of numbing complexity and detail. l 
The field's problems do not lie just in its cumulation of statutes and 
regulations. It also sprawls in its range of subject matters, methodologies, 
and legal structures. It has a base in common law and constitutional law, 
and extends far beyond public law regulation into the realm of theories of 
societal governance. 
Consider the remarkable range of subject matter covered by the 
term "environmental law." Its concerns are international as well as do-
mestic, and indeed its scope embraces the planetary and beyond.2 Its 
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. S.J.D., University of Michigan, 
1983; J.D., Yale University, 1968; A.B., Princeton University, 1965. The author is grateful 
to colleagues Scott Cooper, William Goldfarb, Laura Jensen, Marc Landy, and Patrick 
Nickler of the Boston College Law School Class of 1999, and to Ann Plater, for helpful 
suggestions, and to the Harvard Environmental Law Review editors for organizing what 
proved to be a very intriguing symposium. 
1. Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law in the Law Schools: What We Teach and How 
We Feel About It, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,251 (1989). 
2. Much of the evolving law of outer space in fact sounds in environmental law-the 
degradation of the ozone layer, issues of radioactive contamination of space, of space junk 
cluttering the Earth's geosynchronous orbit, and the like, and even the question whether a 
firm in Georgia should be allowed to launch a mile-wide Mylar billboard into earth orbit to 
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subjects include a menagerie of issues-from nuclear waste management, 
auto exhaust hydrocarbons, national parks and wilderness, leukemia from 
contaminated public wellwater, and suburban growth rolling over rich 
agricultural lands, to the link between water pollution and the fish-killing 
bacteria Pfisteria piscicida, historic battlefields, indigenous tribes losing 
their homelands, seal puppies or endangered spotted owls, siting battles 
over toxic waste disposal facilities, children in urban slums exposed to 
rat bites and lead poisoning, and many more. In the environmental field, 
as the First Law of Ecology holds, everything is connected to everything 
else.3 
The field's methodologies cover a similarly broad spectrum of pos-
sible approaches. They range from the philosophical imperatives of in-
tuitive ethicists to the pragmatics of legal realists and the law-and-
economics faith of the Chicago School. The field's legal terrain likewise 
ranges broadly, from common law, constitutional issues, the subtle vaga-
ries of multilayer statutory accretions and administrative quagmires to 
international and comparative law and cOJ;1tending theories of societal 
governance. It supports professional careers within and outside tradi-
tional legal practice, working with industrial and business clients and 
governmental units at every level, large firms and small, citizen organi-
zations, neighborhoods and individuals. Ultimately, the field of environ-
mental law is so amorphously vast that it is not clear why we even regard 
it as one field. 
This Essay addresses four of the challenges facing academics in this 
field, two of which are logistical and two conceptual. The two logistical 
challenges briefly addressed here are endemic in teaching environmental 
law-choosing what to teach and deciding how to teach it. Today some 
rough generalizations on strategies for curricular coping can be made, 
emerging from the evolution of environmental law courses at many 
American law schools over the past twenty-five years. 
The conceptual challenges may be even more difficult to tackle, and 
are addressed here at greater length: first, how to frame and define this 
sprawling field, and then, how to understand environmental law's real 
life political dynamics-its practical realities and its unique role in so-
cietal governance. This Essay proposes a new way to address these con-
ceptual challenges, the construct of "three economies," splitting the 
realm in which environmental law and economics operate into three 
be visible like a commercial moon to billions of earthbound potential consumers. See gen-
erally Daria Diaz, Trashing the Final Frontier: An Examination of Space Debris from a 
Legal Perspective, 6 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 369 (1993); Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies, Oct. 10, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410; John Kroll, Company Markets Or-
bital Advertising Space, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 13, 1993, at lc. 
3. As the pioneering environmentalist John Muir said, "When we try to pick out 
anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the universe." JOHN MUIR, My 
FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 211 (1911). 
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overlapping spheres. This model seeks to analyze the functional civic 
role of environmental law, the inherent political tensions and contending 
forces that shape environmental law in daily practice, and, perhaps, how 
we are to conceptualize civic governance in the new millenium. 
I. SOME CURRICULAR LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES 
A. What to Teach? 
Surveying the past thirty years of environmental law in the law 
schools-since 1970 when the first Earth Day galvanized a cadre of at-
torneys, law teachers, law students, and citizens to begin integrating the 
lessons of environmental awareness into the legal system-several levels 
of pragmatic compromise have evolved in bringing the field into the law 
school curriculum. 
At the minimum level, virtually all law schools now appear to teach 
at least a basic survey course in environmental law, to which most add a 
basic land use course.4 The majority of schools go beyond this minimal 
model, adding one or more specialized courses. A very few schools am-
bitiously try to extend their curricula to include courses incorporating the 
full range of variegated subjects in the field. 
Under any of these models, designing a satisfactory basic environ-
mental survey course is a frustrating task. Inevitably, the basic course has 
to be a survey. It must take account of constitutional and common law 
features of modern environmental law and a glimpse of natural resources 
law, as well as exploring the complex regulatory systems that are usually 
the heart of the course. Most teachers feel a need to introduce the "Big 
Five" federal statutes in at least some detail. (The exact choice of a "Big 
Five" varies somewhat from professor to professor, but typically in-
cludes: the Clean Water Act ("CWA"); the Clean Air Act ("CAA"); the 
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"); Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"); and 
then another of the teacher's choosing, often the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act ("RCRA") or the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA")). Collecting even brief explorations of each 
of these components into one semester course already is close to an im-
possible task. To this lineup most of us feel obliged to provide our stu-
dents with at least one "deep dive" (as Professor Lazarus has called it)5 
4. There are 168 schools that appear in the cumulative listing of professors teaching 
environmental law, and 111 in land use law. See WESTGROUP, DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACH-
ERS 1114-18, 1173-75 (1998-99). Land use law is closely tied into the environmental cur-
riculum because it echoes so many of the themes and techniques of environmental law 
generally. 
5. During the symposium presentations, Prof. Lazarus described several possible 
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into the technicalities of one of the areas of inquiry. This might involve 
modelling a RCRA hazardous substance listing, working through a Su-
perfund cleanup with negotiations and settlement controversies, or the 
like. 
None of the possible compromises avoids unfortunate tradeoffs. Given 
the inescapable triage choices in statutory coverage, inevitably some stu-
dents feel dissatisfied because they are not taught more of the two or 
three dozen other federal and state statutes that play significant roles in 
the field. 
For some, a compromise approach has been to impose a legal proc-
ess analysis on the basic survey course instead of focusing on only one or 
two pollution statutes as paradigms for the whole field.6 By studying a 
series of environmental law cases and structures throughout the legal 
system as an opportunity to analyze the different types of "taxonomies" 
they represent, students are encouraged to develop the skill of extrapo-
lating, analogizing, and transposing their understanding of particular 
statutory mechanisms onto other statutes that have siinilar characteristics. 
By analyzing the different statutory regimes, students can undertake 
regulatory design inquiries: What kinds of legal mechanisms are created 
in each case to apply standards? What different kinds of standard-setting 
procedures are implemented by the statutes? What kinds of structural 
legal mechanisms are used in each case to apply the standards? What 
different kinds of characteristic results and implications follow from the 
different statutory design choices? 
Given the evident shortcomings of the broad-smattering survey 
course, many schools apparently perceive a need to offer at least one 
course beyond the base. There is a useful curriculum analogy to tax law 
here. For the same reason that most schools have a tax curriculum with 
more offerings than the one basic course in income taxation, law students 
who want to be prepared to begin a professional life in environmental 
practice require far more than the basic survey.7 A basic environmental 
survey course can give students some sense of the range of mechanisms 
involved and an introduction to the extensive esoteric terminology of the 
field, but not a deep sense of what lawyers really have to do in modern 
environmental practice. To answer this need, many schools offer a spe-
cialized elective course in at least one of the Big Five pollution statutes, 
providing concentrated opportunities to take more substantial deep dives 
"deep dives" into specific regulations, designed to give students a sense of the technical 
depth as well as the breadth of the field. 
6. Responses to the challenges of the field have been built on this Saxian approach. 
See generally ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, 
LAW, AND SOCIETY (2d ed., 1998). 
7. Environmental law is now technically more voluminous than tax law. The Internal 
Revenue Code and its regulations add up to something on the order of 6000 pages. The 
cumulative statute and regulatory pages for just three of the major federal regulatory stat-
utes-the CWA, the CAA, and the RCRA-total more than 11,546 pages. 
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into one of these regulatory systems.s Without such advanced elective 
courses, many students typically would never find an opportunity to work 
with the Code of Federal Regulations, an essential element of modern 
administrative practice. The specialized courses also allow students to 
dig far more deeply into the complex relationships between the legal 
provisions and the science and economics of the specialty areas covered 
in the course. 
Only a few schools appear to have attempted the ambitious task of 
extending their curricula to cover all or nearly all the major subject areas 
that exist within the environmental law field. These schools offer more 
than fifteen or twenty elective courses, and often support masters-level 
programs in the field. Again, the tax analogy is relevant. Not all attorneys 
who practice in the area need the equivalent of specialized degrees, but it 
is useful that such programs exist for those who want to shape their 
training with laser-like focus. 
B. How to Teach It? 
How does one cope, especially in the survey course, with the cover-
age problems imposed by the breadth of the field ("If this is Tuesday, this 
must be RCRA .... ") and the technical depth of the material ("If indus-
trial waste is hazardous, one must first determine whether it meets one of 
the toxicity, corrosivity, ignitability, or reactivity parameters of Subtitle 
C; if it does not fit one of these parameters yet still is physically hazard-
ous, what compensatory controls are to be given under Subtitle D to limit 
potentially-harmful public exposures?")? 
To avoid the "numbing" learning and teaching experiences chroni-
cled by Professor Sax, teachers try to build several instructive, engaging 
slices into the mechanics and dynamics of environmental law practice as 
part of their courses. Thus environmental law classes often have pio-
neered the academic simulation approach in their law schools, or pre-
sented guided reading puzzles for student problem solving, drafting exer-
cises, role playing, or linear tracking of complex and engaging ~ase 
studies like the vivid story of toxic contamination and leukemia in Wo-
burn, Massachusetts, chronicled in the book and movie A Civil Action.9 
8. "As teachers in a professional school, our course offerings are inevitably driven 
to some extent by the issues that engage contemporary practice . . .. [Environmental 
teachers in particular face] the bewildering question of how shall we help our students 
prepare for the world of their mature years." Sax, supra note 1, at 10,253. 
9. See JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995). As the New York Times recently 
noted, dozens if not hundreds of classes in environmenta1law and policy around the coun-
try have picked up on the Civil Action narrative to engage students in an analytical inquiry 
into the law, science, and process of such complex conflicts. See William Glaberson, Best-
Seller Account of a Lawsuit Spurs Law School Change, N.Y. 'liMES, Dec. 26, 1998, at AI. 
There is, in fact, a minor ongoing controversy about this use of A Civil Action. The Wall 
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Many schools, pushed by their students, have launched active environ-
mental law societies and environmental law clinics. 
Although most teachers seek to prepare their students for the difficult 
problem-solving that they will be called on to do, an environmental law 
course should be more than a practical education. The field invites an 
exploration of a range of fascinating theoretical problems, such as the 
variety of conceptual bases for designing different modes of environ-
mental regimes (e.g., the ongoing debates between command-and-control 
traditions and market-based techniques). Ultimately, environmental law 
offers uniquely penetrating perspectives on societal governance. 10 
II. A CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGE: DEFINING AND FRAMING THE FIELD OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW WITHIN THREE ECONOMIES 
What do such vastly dissimilar subject matter areas and legal issues 
have in common that allows them all to be included within what is alleg-
edly one single field, "environmental" law? If a workable definition of 
such a common thread can be found, how do we visualize the field so as 
to make sense of it as more than an agglomeration of its various constitu-
ent parts? 
A. Environmental Law and the Marketplace 
What the diverse issue areas and inquiries of environmental law 
have in common-from wildlife to industrial pollution, from genetically 
engineered pesticides to historic preservation conflicts, and beyond-is 
that virtually all of them are about the near and far consequences of hu-
man actions. The marketplace of human enterprise is the prime generator, 
not only of the unprecedented wealth, power, and technological achieve-
Street Journal editorially criticized the use of the book, and this writer's advice to "engage 
students activery," as a soft-headed dilution of the process of learning the law. Editorial, 
Uncivil Action, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 1999, at A22. In rejoinder, the author would note that 
the Wall Street Journal should applaud this trend. Most professors do not in fact teach A 
Civil Action as an uncritical paean of praise for the plaintiff'S attorney, the "Porsche-
driving, mustachioed Mr. Schlictmann," but rather as a challenging, multi-level analytical 
puzzle. Many professors attempt to teach their students complex technical hands-on prob-
lem-solving skills, as distinct from the passive lecture model of law classes or the artificial 
games of wit of The Paper Chase. See JOHN J. OSBORN, THE PAPER CHASE (1971). 
10. While the tax law curriculum may provide a useful analogy for comparisons 
with environmental law because of its similar struggle with a highly complex set of regu-
lations which govern the field, it falls behind environmental law when one shifts to the 
field's conceptual role in society. Unlike tax law, environmental law is more than a mecha-
nism for functional implementation of legislative policies. Environmental law embodies a 
civic-societal philosophy as well as the doctrines and mechanics of a system of behavioral 
regulation. . 
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ments in modem society, but also of virtually all problems we call "envi-
ronmental." 
Part of the reason why human enterprises cause environmental dys-
function comes from the chronic uncertainty and ignorance about causes 
and consequences that so often characterize environmental issues. One 
can never know all of the attenuated consequences that follow from a 
particular technological action. Environmental law has identified many of 
these deeply problematic consequences, but thousands of others are cur-
rently completely unknown and may remain so. Who would have 
guessed, for instance, that when industry turned to chlorinated hydrocar-
bons for a wide range of manufacturing applications that they would ul-
timately cause substantial problems ranging from "smoke inhalation poi-
soning" when PVC pipes and wiring bum to produce a vapor resembling 
mustard gas, to the sexual problems of alligators in Lake Apopka in 
Florida?ll 
Even where potential consequences are known, the logic of cost-
externalization drives human enterprises to pass on potential and actual 
social costs into the commons of society and the environment. As ra-
tional choice theorists have observed, virtually all human behavior is 
motivated by the logic of individualized cost-benefit analysis. Humans 
tend to make decisions on relatively short-term horizons, and in insulated 
self-referential terms. We strenuously avoid and ignore burdensome li-
abilities if we can, hoping or pretending that negative consequences will 
disappear. When we are involved in a production activity, we resolutely 
display an inclination to pass wide the costs, while holding close the 
benefits and profits. Thus there is a universal tendency of individuals and 
associations toward cost externalization. 
The "bottom line"-measured in money, power, security, pleasures, 
and satisfactions-drives virtually all corporate and individual actions, 
and the political-economic marketplace that emerges from this phenome-
non is an accumulation of a myriad of individual "bottom lines," a pow-
erful system built upon each component's profit-maximizing drive. The 
networked accumulation of a myriad of" individual units seeking to 
maximize their bottom lines creates what we have come to call "the mar-
ketplace," a politically and economically powerful system of human 
systems built upon all its components' profit-maximizing drives.12 
11. See THEO COLBORN ET AL., OUR STOLEN FUTURE: ARE WE THREATENING OUR 
FERTILITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND SURVIVAL?-A SCIENTIFIC DETECTIVE STORY 170 (1996). 
In many areas of the country, including Florida, the sexual orientation of wildlife, and its 
reproductive organs, appear to be affected by cumulated chlorinated hydrocarbons acting 
as estrogen mimics and endocrine disruptors. This raises truly disturbing portents for hu-
man endocrine systems and child development. See id. at 6, 150-53, 168, 171-97. 
12. The use of the term "marketplace" is intended to describe not only the inter-
related transactional systems of private corporations and individuals, but also the structures 
of governmental agencies that, intertwined together with the private enterprise process, 
have come to constitute so much of the societal governance process. 
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"The marketplace," it can be argued, is the single most dominant 
structure of human organization today, far more pervasive than govern-
ment systems. It has induced astonishing technological accomplishments 
and, for many, it has brought about the highest standard of living in hu-
man history. Manifested in millions of transactions of daily life within 
and between corporations, governmental players, and individuals, the 
structure and processes of the marketplace powerfully drive the choices 
of what will and will not be done by all participants. 
The marketplace, however, deals almost exclusively with things that 
have a market price or value, things that can be bought and sold. It inher-
ently ignores many public and private values that are not directly relevant 
to maximization of its individual participants' political and economic 
profits. This tendency to focus on profit and to ignore concerns that are 
not readily quantifiable in dollar terms feeds back into the logic of 
maximizing the bottom line while passing on costs whenever possible. 
Moreover, efforts to force civic values and accountability on the market-
place, whether by government action or private effort, encounter resis-
tance. The marketplace mobilizes great political force to maintain its 
momentum, and can often induce governments to adopt short-term, nar-
rowed market-based frames of reference. If a universal behavioral ten-
dency toward cost externalization is the base cause of the majority of 
environmental problems, defining an appropriate balance between the 
marketplace and the role of government is the abiding riddle in resolving 
them. 
What then is the role of environmental law? Given the pervasive 
logic of individual cost externalization, and marketplace resistance to 
diffuse civic concerns, environmental law attempts to provide a societal 
accounting of many of the major societal problems externalized by the 
marketplace. Its mandate is to chart a societal course toward more sus-
tainable modes of production, consumption, and quality of life. This un-
fortunately means that environmental law often finds itself in tension 
with the marketplace. 
B. The Three Economies 
The construct of three economies aids in defining the societal role of 
environmental law. There are many different thematic constructs used to 
organize the presentation of environmental law analysis: the uncertainty 
and scientific complexity associated with pollution regulation, Rachel 
Carson's theory of interconnectedness,!3 an administrative law focus, 
cost-benefit-risk analysis, other overarching law-and-economics ap-
13. See generally RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1987) 
(1962). 
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pro aches, juxtapositions between crusading moral outrage and cool-
headed analysis, environmental justice, and more. 
Since economics has become such a dominant structure for under-
standing and shaping human behavior, it seems appropriate to define the 
role and function of this field of governance in structural economic 
terms. Building on Professor Sax's lead, with help from the Law and So-
ciety and Civil-Society initiatives, one can formulate yet another ap-
proach: environmental law should be viewed as operating in the context 
of three economies, not just one.14 
Professor Sax proposed that environmental law be viewed through 
two economies. Mulling over Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council,15 he criticized the Justice's premise that envi-
ronmentallaw regulations that overrode private property rights had to be 
justifiable solely in market terms recognized at common law. In short, 
Scalia's opinion required that regulations prohibiting development in the 
barrier beach erosion zone be justified in market-based terms, either as a 
function of common law titles to property or of tort protections of the 
property rights of others.16 Sax argued that the focus on the marketplace 
economy in defining legal rights missed an important reality: that envi-
ronmental regulations operate within and are designed to protect a differ-
ent economy as well-namely, the "economy of nature." The South 
Carolina coastal regulation in Lucas attempted to protect barrier beaches 
that fluctuated with natural cycles, with their constituent natural systems, 
wildlife, and other components of the economy of nature. On the other 
hand, the marketplace economy as reflected in Lucas "considers such 
functions expendable. Indeed, getting rid of the natural, or at least do-
mesticating it, was a primary task of the European settlers from North 
America. An ecological view of property, the economy of nature, is fun-
damentally different .... "17 
14. This analysis builds on a sketch of the constructs set out in the introductory 
chapter of our recent casebook, and echoed in a subsequent festschriJt for Professor Sax. 
See PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 56-59; Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Three Economies: An 
Essay in Honor of Joseph Sax, 25 EcOLOGY L.Q. 411, 429-37 (1998). 
15. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
16. In Lucas, Justice Scalia wrote that regulations depriving land of all "economic 
benefit" constitutionally require compensation unless the restrictions are ones "that back-
ground principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land 
ownership." ld. at 1029. The marketplace thus implicitly incorporates an expectation of 
tort and property law restrictions on real estate as natural and legitimate. In contrast, gov-
ernmental regulations under the police power are deemed artificial and hence constitution-
ally suspect. 
17. Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lu-
cas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433, 1442 (1993). Sax there 
refers to "the transformative economy" for what here will be labeled "the marketplace 
economy." Private property rights are primarily defined with reference to the daily reality 
of marketplace ownership, and it has been these property rights that drive what has become 
the greatest economy in the history of the world. 
Why use the word "economy"? The concept of a natural "economy" functionally 
HeinOnline -- 23 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 368 1999
368 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 23 
This formulation of a second economy, the "economy of nature," 
however, is insufficient to capture the full realm of environmental law. 
Moreover, the concept of an economy of nature does not automatically 
persuade and enlist those who hold market-dominated views of the legal 
system. Market-oriented players generally perceive no compelling reason 
to acknowledge the role of environmental law in protecting the "economy 
of nature" other than altruism. Limiting the model to "two economies" 
also misses a further important sector of societal concern, the realm of 
those human concerns that, like the economy of nature, are externalized 
from and lie outside the marketplace economy. 
Thus, in both political and logical terms there must be a third con-
ceptual economy, the "civic-societal economy."IS "Sustainability," the 
current dominant formulation for defining the fundamental objectives of 
global environmental law and policy,19 is a concept that necessarily in-
echoes AIdo Leopold's lyrical descriptions of how an ecosystem works and evolves: 
Land, then, is not merely soil; it is a fountain of energy flowing through a cir-
cuit of soils, plants, and animals. Food chains are the living channels which 
conduct energy upward; death and decay return it to the soil. The circuit is not 
closed; some energy is dissipated in decay, some is added by absorption from 
the air, some is stored in soils, peats, and long-lived forests; but it is a sus-
tained circuit, like a slowly augmented revolving fund of life .... 
The velocity and character of the upward flow of energy depend on the com-
plex structure of the plant and animal community, much as the upward flow of 
sap in a tree depends on its complex cellular organization. Without this com-
plexity, normal circulation would presumably not occur. Structure means the 
characteristic numbers, as well as the characteristic kinds and functions, of the 
component species. This interdependence between the complex structure of 
the land and its smooth functioning as an energy unit is one of its basic attrib-
utes. 
When a change occurs in one part of the circuit, many other parts must adjust 
themselves to it. Change does not necessarily obstruct or divert the flow of en-
ergy; evolution is a long series of self-induced changes, the net result of which 
has been to elaborate the flow mechanism and to lengthen the circuit. 
ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC, WITH ESSAYS ON CONSERVATION FROM 
ROUND 'RIVER 253-54 (Oxford Univ. Press 1966) (1948). 
In today's terms, an "economy" is probably the most appropriate concept to indicate 
that natural ecosystems are equally intricate and decisive self-contained systems for man-
aging inputs and outputs, adaptations and changes, of their constituent elements. Garrett 
Hardin once argued, however, that economics should be a component of, and subordinated 
to, the greater sphere of ecology, rather than vice versa. See GARRETT HARDIN, EXPLORING 
NEW ETHICS FOR SURVIVAL: THE VOYAGE OF THE SPACESHIP BEAGLE 73 (1972). 
18. As with the "marketplace" economy, the semantic labels of these three concepts 
can be varied. It is possible to label the third economy as the "public" economy, but this 
rubric already has a different connotation to economists. Just saying "civic" economy im-
plies too little, while "societal" economy is too amorphous. So for the time being it re-
mains here unmelodiously as the "civic-societal" economy. 
19. The concept of "Sustainable Development" was launched by the 1987 
"Brundtland Commission Report." See THE WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEV., OUR 
COMMON FUTURE 43-65 (1987). This concept then became Principle One of the Rio Dec-
laration that emerged from the unprecedented 1992 conclave of 140 heads of state and 
prime ministers at Rio de Janeiro addressing global environmental issues. See U.N. Con-
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eludes human concerns as well as natural ecological realities. The basic 
societal and governmental objective of "sustainable development" is thus 
built upon three economies, not just one economy or two. 
Here are three economies, with the following schematic diagram 
suggesting the three realms in which environmental law operates: 
THE THREE ECONOMIES 
The relative size of the three economies in proportion to one another 
depends very much upon the observer's personal perspective).20 
The "marketplace economy" is the familiar, dynamic economy that 
dominates the daily life of individuals and nations and forms the system 
that most people refer to when they talk about "economics" and short-
term "economic necessities." The social welfare economics often noted 
in academic discussions of "economics" are not included. The market-
place economy is comprised of both private and public participants, 
linked in a structure of interwoven interests. Its economics and political 
ference on Env't and Dev., U.N. Doc. A1CONF/15115, 31I.L.M. 874 (1992) [hereinafter 
Rio UNCED]; see also Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21, U.N. 
GAOR, 19th Special Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A1S-19129 (1997). See generally Sympo-
sium, The Role of Law in Defining Sustainable Development, 3 WIDENER L. SYMPOSIUM J. 
1-522 (Fall 1998). 
20. To many marketplace economists, the marketplace economy incorporates virtu-
ally everything worth considering. Concerns lying outside the structure of the daily mar-
ketplace are marginal and hard to conceive. To some biologists, the economy of nature 
may be the dominant economy in terms of size and complexity, likely to survive in some 
form longer than the human players defining the marketplace and civic-societal economies. 
To persons who are in a position to be concerned with the long-term prospering and sur-
vival of human societies, the perspective of the civic-societal economy, by definition ex-
tending beyond this or next fiscal year, ultimately dwarfs the private marketplace mecha-
nisms which dominate the economic perspective of most people. 
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power, however, are shaped by its myriad transactions and its partici-
pants' fractionalized interests, so that it tends to avoid consideration of 
broader impacts upon the natural world and public interests, which there-
fore are only coincidentally integrated within it. 
The "economy of nature," as Professor Sax discerned it, is a sepa-
rate system, supplying the context and the vast majority of resources for 
human society and the marketplace economy, as well as absorbing many 
of its chronic externalizations. The vast, extended ecosystems of living 
organisms in their physical settings, the geophysics of the carbon cycle, 
the water cycle, solar energy absorption, and global weather patterns, all 
interact within the economy of nature. Typically, however, they are inte-
grated into the marketplace economy only as commodities. 
The "civic-societal economy" denotes the realm of human societal 
concerns that exist beyond the logic and considerations of the market-
place economy. The civic-societal economy encompasses the public, so-
cietal values, ethics, benefits and losses that cumulatively shape the full 
and long-term interests of society. If endemic chemical exposures, for exam-
ple, cause illnesses that cannot be traced back to accountable sources in the 
marketplace economy, these public costs will largely remain in the civic-
societal realm. The full economics of such systemic problems largely 
will be ignored by marketplace players focusing on their individual bot-
tom lines. 
Analytically splitting out the latter two economies provides a tool 
for forcing a conceptual analysis of the realities they represent in modern 
environmental law, which otherwise may be eclipsed and neglected 
within the marketplace economy's dominance of modern governance. 
Sound economic analysis and law must be extended at least to include 
the latter two realms' impacts on humans and our society.21 
Once the cost externalizations of the marketplace economy pass into 
the natural and the civic-societal economies, their harms aggregate and 
are only with difficulty dragged back into the marketplace economy for 
an accounting. When industrial pollution is discharged into the natural 
economy, some of it may ultimately accumulate there, but most of these 
externalities also pass on into the civic-societal economy, because dis-
ruptions of the natural economy often reverberate in dysfunctional con-
sequences to humans. Chlorinated hydrocarbons in the environment may 
harm not only fish, birds, and alligators, but also the reproductive, be-
havioral,and cognitive development systems of humans who breathe the 
air, drink the water, and are a part of the same food chains.22 As far as the 
21. Environmental law is often concerned with natural systems, but usually it is 
most directly concerned with protection of human welfare. Even concerns about purely 
"natural" things are generally filtered through the consideration humans hold for them. 
22. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 11 at 166-96 (indicating effects on human 
sperm counts, fetal development, intelligence quotient, and neurological conditions. as 
well as cancer). 
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marketplace economy is concerned, however, these consequences are 
invisible or academic. Because the causation chains are attenuated or im-
perceptible, these harms occur in a realm of non-attributability, non-
accountability, and non-liability. 
All the individual bottom lines that constitute the marketplace econ-
omy do not inherently add up to a positive bottom line for society as a 
whole. To the contrary, the public interest eventually will have to cope 
with far more of these substantial negatives than the private actors within 
the marketplace economy who see and enjoy only their short-term gains. 
The marketplace economy is probably the most intricate and sophisti-
cated mechanism ever devised to manage the extraordinary complexity of 
human society. Yet because the marketplace economy deals almost exclu-
sively with goods and services which can be given market values for 
short-term private transactions, it systemically resists acknowledgment of 
many important elements of reality, both natural and human. 
The three economies model demonstrates that environmental law 
inhabits a space that exceeds the interstices of the marketplace. In the 
economy of nature it seeks a fuller accounting of externalities, and in the 
civic-societal economy it seeks to protect public values and resources in 
the long-term. The concerns of environmental law within all three 
economies are institutionalized through statutory and regulatory systems, 
as well as constitutional and common law doctrines including the public 
trust doctrine. Most often, environmental regulations are designed to 
protect the human interests represented within the civic-societal econ-
omy.23 International environmental law's Precautionary Principle, how-
ever, warns us that failure to remedy disruptions of natural systems often 
pose threats of serious human and civic consequences.24 Environmental 
law is perhaps the best example in modern legal systems where calcula-
tions of the future needs of human society are incorporated into the proc-
ess of setting present-day operative norms. 
The broader scope of environmental law envisioned by the three 
economies provides a fuller picture of its role in society than many other 
characterizations do. In the conception of many market players, environ-
mental law often is viewed merely as an annoying concession, an array of 
required Band-Aids or gadfly-induced palliatives, targeted opportunisti-
23. Even where environmental law seems to focus on the protection of a natural 
system purely for the sake of that natural system-as in the protection of an endangered 
species where there is no known or likely utilitarian benefit to human society from that 
protection-in most cases pragmatic political advocacy of such natural protections must 
seek and emphasize linkages to human welfare. See Zygmunt Plater, The Embattled Social 
Utilities o/the Endangered Species Act, 27 ENVTL. L. 845, 852-53 (1997). 
24. See generally DAVID FREESTONE & ELLEN HAY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCI-
PLE & INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION (1996); See also ED-
WARD TENNER, WHY THINGS BITE BACK: TECHNOLOGY AND THE REVENGE OF UNIN-
TENDED CONSEQUENCES (1996) (showing continual replays of the Law of Unintended 
Consequences in the effects of technology upon natural systems). 
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cally throughout the structures of the marketplace to blunt the sharp 
edges of entrepreneurial activities-in each case a profitless tradeoff 
against economic returns. In the less jaundiced view of others, the role of 
environmental law is conceived of as a "partnering" with the market-
place, with the bottom-line logic of the economic system shaping the 
ultimate standards and implementation of regulatory constraints.25 Often 
environmental protection principles have been perceived as afterthought 
overlays upon decisions made in the traditional processes of the market-
place. ' 
These narrower conceptions tend both to obscure the fact that govern-
ment and markets have different roles and to marginalize the significant so-
cietal role that this field plays in modem industrial democracies. Yet, in the 
post-Rio era, environmental law cannot be relegated to the status of a 
mere afterthought.26 As early as the 1960s, Rachel Carson demonstrated 
that the tendency to externalize costs through short-term individualized 
thinking can be quite dysfunctional in overall societal terms. A modem 
legal system coping with societal realities must take account of the cu-
mulative negative effects of human enterprise as well as its positive eco-
nomic consequencesY Building on Rachel Carson's guiding perceptions, 
environmental law has become a way to address marketplace extern ali-
zation and to counteract the blurring of roles between government and 
the marketplace. 
Beginning in 1970, a parade of several dozen major federal statutes, 
often echoed by state corollaries, marched into the law books.28 With the 
help of citizen enforcement in the courts, these statutes created a serious 
mandatory structure of protections against the environmental excesses of 
marketplace players. Viewed through the schematic diagram of the three 
economies, the locus of most environmental law regulations lies within 
the rings surrounding the marketplace economy, in directly protecting the 
25. This would include the wistful theories of "free market environmentalism," and 
much of the law and economics literature seeking to define an acceptable marketplace role 
for environmental law. See generally ThRRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE 
MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991). 
·26. See generally Rio UNCED, supra note 19. 
27. See CARSON, supra note 13, at 187-98. 
28. In the early 1970s, Congress passed an unprecedented volume of statutes-the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, the 
Noise Control Act of 1972, the Clean Water Act of 1972, the Natural and Scenic Rivers 
Act, the Coastal Zone Management Act, and at least two dozen more. There were more 
than 30 significant environmental statutes passed in the three years after the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act. See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., NATURE, LAW, & SOCIETY 
ThACHER'S MANUAL 358-60 (1992) (historical statutory appendix). In terms of legislative 
volume, only President Carter's years come close, with 20 legislative acts in an equivalent 
span, many of which merely amended and fine-tuned prior acts. These modern statutory 
systems reflected Rachel Carson's teachings, addressing ecological and economic values 
and problems that had not been adequately acknowledged or accounted for in previous 
public and private law. 
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economy of nature (as in the Endangered Species Act, the Wilderness 
Act, Marine Sanctuaries, and NEPA), or in protecting the civic-societal 
economy (as in the pollution statutes and other laws that focus on health 
effects, such as OSHA and RCRA).29 The natural and civic-societal 
economies also contain the public trust doctrine (with its principles of 
intergenerational equity, legacy, and cultural values), as well as other 
constitutional theories of environmental protection. In some cases, the 
common law also operates in these two economies, as when public nui-
sance actions try to assert public values over marketplace externaliza-
tions, or other tort theories are used in defense of public interests beyond 
market accountings. 
The "economic" values protected by environmental law in the econ-
omy of nature and the civic-societal economy are neither marginal nor 
incidental. The costs of environmental illness to humans are astronomic, 
but these costs are at best only partially reflected in the marketplace 
economy. Costs externalized into the economy of nature are often com-
pletely intangible in economic terms.30 In the past several years, however, 
a number of resource economists have developed projects to quantify a 
dollar value for resources and "ecological services" that the economy of 
nature provides the traditional marketplace economy. These "natural 
capital" accounting projects have adduced astonishing sums for the an-
nual value of natural inputs into human society. Though these inputs are 
largely taken for granted as free goods, costing only the expense of re-
source capture, these resource economics accounting projects have esti-
mated their annual value (most of which lies completely outside market 
accounting) in the range of u.S. $16-54 trillion per year.31 A number of 
economic theorists now say that realistic'measures of economic perform-
ance must take account of environmental and human life quality effects, 
29. Environmental law sometimes focuses on marketplace externalities purely in 
terms of the economy of nature itself, where there are few or no material consequences 
upon human welfare-as in those cases of endangered species protection where no sub-
stantial human utility is served, in humane treatment cases, in ecological preservation for 
moral, religious, aesthetic, or intellectual purposes, and the like. 
More often, environmental law is directed against marketplace externalities that di-
rectly impact human welfare in the civic-societal economy-as in human toxic exposures, 
urban transit, and historic preservation-without reference to the economy of nature, or 
where marketplace externalities impinge upon natural systems so as to cause consequential 
harms to human welfare in the civic, societal economy-as with global warming, Forest 
Service clearcutting sales, and toxic discharges into the nation's waters. 
30. For example, it would be difficult if not impossible to quantify the cost of a par-
ticular species' extinction. 
31. The Gross Natural Product ("GNP") of the entire planet today is around U.S. 
$18 trillion per year. See Robert Costanza, et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem 
Services and Natural Capital, NATURE, May 1997, at 253; see also Robert Putnam, Bowl-
ing Alone, America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 66, 66-67 (1995) (argu-
ing that "social capital," one of the nations most important assets, is threatened by the 
deterioration of civic engagement between people and communities, given the stresses of 
life in the modern marketplace economy). 
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and propose the adoption of a Net National Product accounting instead of 
the traditional Gross National Product.32 A society ignores such costs at 
its peril. 
III. A CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGE: ANALYZING THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
We have more and more "environmental artillery": more lawyers 
working on problems that seem increasingly sophisticated, with 
ever greater economic stakes, and at the same time ever greater at-
tenuation from the ultimate causes and concerns that gave rise to 
the field.33 
What might the "three economies" construct, as proposed in this 
sketch, add to the teaching and academic inquiries of today's environ-
mental law? Beyond defining the structural role of environmental law as 
representing cumulative long-term needs and values too often ignored in 
the political process and the marketplace, the three economies offer a 
context for analyzing the dynamics of environmental law in practice and 
in national politics. The contending forces and tendencies within the 
practice and politics of environmental law cannot be understood in dis-
jointed individual terms. As one considers all of the rules and structures 
of particular statutes, or common law theories of tort liability in envi-
ronmental settings, the details can be so voluminous that they mask the 
larger tendencies and contending forces within the structure. The three 
economies framework offers a way to see and to examine the broader 
trends at work when studying environmental law at the micro-level. 
The day-to-day reality of environmental practice in legislatures, 
agencies, and courts reflects not only issues of scientific fact-finding and 
32. See generally PAUL HAWKEN, THE ECOLOGY OF COMMERCE: How BUSINESS 
CAN SAVE THE PLANET (1993) (providing a base analysis of what is wrong with traditional 
measures of economic health). Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") has for various rhetorical 
reasons generally replaced GNP, but GDP likewise resolutely ignores cumulative negative 
considerations. Many theorists have been arguing that measurements of national welfare 
must take more realistic account of socially experienced quality of life. See also Marc 
Breslow, Is the U.S. Making Progress? Unlike GD?, a New Measure Says "No", DOLLARS 
AND SENSE, Mar.lApr. 1996 (reporting on the Redefining Progress group's substitution of 
the Genuine Progress Indicator for the usual GDP measures, which arrived at more conser-
vative views of national economic health). See generally AMARTYA SEN, ON ECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY (1997) (contrasting and evaluating various measures of inequality); Clifford 
Cobb et al., If the GDP Is Up, Why Is America Down?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1995, at 
59 (addressing, "Why we need new measures of progress, why we do not have them, and 
how they would change the social and political landscape"). 
33. See Sax, supra note 1, at 10,252 (quoting a letter from Prof. David Getches of 
the University of Colorado). 
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doctrinal legal analysis, but also a dominating tension among the three 
economies. Industry lobbyists on environmental law issues typically cast 
their arguments in terms of the public interest even though their driving 
agenda is marketplace self-interest. They emphasize setting "reasonable" 
degrees of public protections by balancing protection with public pros-
perity, jobs, and economic security. 
The marketplace's inherent resistance to the assertion of public val-
ues may be a well-known fact, but it often goes discreetly unacknow-
ledged. One can not understand the realities of modern environmental 
law, however, without understanding the pervasive, coordinated, day-to-
day pressures that shape legislative bills and agency programs in intricate 
detail. The dramatic story of the 104th Congress is a vivid example of 
this political-economic landscape. In the first session of the "Contract 
With America" Congress, the marketplace asserted its dominance in en-
vironmental law through a raw avalanche of power, with industrial lob-
byists writing and passing a series of House bills rolling back federal 
environmentallaws.34 The lobbying structures of the marketplace power-
fully shape legislative bills, regulation and enforcement, media coverage, 
scientific disclosure, and judicial perceptions.35 Marketplace resistance is 
such a logically inevitable and systemically pervasive phenomenon that 
any environmental law analysis that ignores it is naIve. 
34. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law as a Mirror of the Future: Civic 
Values Confronting Market Force Dynamics in a Time of Counter-Revolution, 23 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 733, 734-35, 742-62 (1996). 
35. The political power of the marketplace operates on the broadest scale-from 
legislative and administrative lobbying and the "capture" phenomenon to public relations 
campaigns. For instance, the "Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environ-
ment" ("FREE"), receives support from manufacturing and resource-depletion industries 
and industry-oriented foundations, and offers free getaways for judges as well as profes-
sors, journalists, and others thought to shape public policy. In 1997 alone, FREE says, 
"eight percent of the entire federal judiciary attended one of our four seminars", and to 
date, 40% of the judiciary has attended one of FREE's week-long, all-expenses-paid holi-
days in Montana where they learned about the excessive protections given endangered 
species, and the necessity of compensating private corporations for restrictions protecting 
public environmental values. See Ruth Marcus, Issues Groups Fund Seminars for Judges, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1998, at AI. See generally ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 19. 
Marketplace interests have lushly funded the growth of law-and-economics in the 
nation's law schools. "Tens of millions of dollars have been invested in the law-and-
economics movement, which has gained immense influence in leading law schools [in 
a] crusade against regulation." Karen M. Paget, Lessons of Right-Wing Philanthropy, AM. 
PROSPECf, Sept. 1998, at 91. 
Marketplace pressures undercut the work of scientists whose research reveals social 
costs of products and industrial processes. The author was told by Sherwood Rowland, a 
Nobel Laureate in chemistry at the University of California, that from the time he an-
nounced his theory that chlorofluorocarbons were producing dangerous holes in the ozone 
layer, his invitations to speak at university chemistry departments around the country, gen-
erally industry-funded, and his grant-funded roster of graduate students, both dried up. 
Conversation with Sherwood Rowland, Gruter Institute, Squaw Valley, Cal., (June 19, 
1993). Once Rowland was nominated for the Nobel Prize, his invitations and funding re-
sumed. The author suspects this story is not unique. 
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The same market forces that make civic regulation necessary, con-
stantly and assiduously attempt to resist and undercut that regulation. 
The "Syllogism of Marketplace Resistance" would go something like 
this: 
Reflecting human nature, the market forces that build the economy 
inherently tend to externalize their costs, which necessitates some 
form of externally-imposed regulation incorporating public values, 
which in turn these market forces continuously, powerfully, and 
comprehensively tend to resist, deflect, dilute, avoid, or repeal. 
It is no surprise that the marketplace resists the imposition of public 
values upon private enterprises. For years in Corporate Law, we have 
taught that the duty of corporations is to maximize the profits of their 
shareholders, not to advance any altruistic broader public good. When 
governments attempt to impose non-market public values upon an indus-
try (or upon private individuals), there is an understandable instinct to 
attempt to avoid or resist such imposition and the attendant costs. The 
tendency of each economic entity to resist cost internalization is multi-
plied by tens of thousands of corporations, coordinated in trade associa-
tions and industrial lobbies. It has resulted in governments' competition 
to attract industry by lowering pollution standards or minimizing en-
forcement, a process also known as the "race to the bottom."36 Ulti-
mately, this vast concurrent resistance permeates and impedes public ef-
forts to instill civic values into the governance process. 
How do marketplace actors react to regulations and guidelines ap-
plying public values that undercut private gain? They react in quite un-
derstandable human terms: 
• seeking to comply, especially when regulations are mandatory and 
genuine enforcement is likely; 
36. Perceptions of such an inter-state "race of laxity" or "race to the bottom" 
prompted the dramatic series of federal pollution statutes in the 1970s in which Washing-
ton took on a dominant role in environmental regulation. Recently, however, a revisionist 
academic argument has arisen asserting that there never has been such a competition be-
tween states to attract industry by lowering environmental regulation and enforcement. 
Professor Richard Revesz argues that logical models are inconsistent with race-to-the-
bottom claims and that competition among the states should produce an efficient allocation 
of industrial activity rather than a race-to-the-bottom. In contrast, Professor Kristin H. 
Engel responds to Revesz's argument by suggesting that there are a number of well-
established economic models that predict a race-to-the-bottom. See Richard Revesz, Reha-
bilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Fed-
eral Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210, 1211-12 (1992). Bllt see Kristin 
H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "To the Bot-
tom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 297-98 (1997); see also ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 309-17 (2d ed. 1998). 
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• seeking to avoid compliance, either on the facts by denying the 
existence or validity of the problem, or on the law by contesting the 
authority of agencies, courts, or private citizen plaintiffs, and ag-
gressively litigating every step of the way; 
• trying to undercut regulatory effectiveness by advocating cuts in 
appropriations, particularly appropriations for enforcement;37 
• trying to modify or minimize regulatory implementation through 
lobbying and negotiation; 
• trying to modify or repeal the restrictive requirements of statutes 
and regulations, arguing that "the pendulum has swung too far." 
These strategies can run concurrently. In the first decade of envi-
ronmental law, when enforcement structures were new and uncertain, 
resistance to enforcement was probably a prevalent mode, along with 
simultaneous limited gestures toward compliance. Subsequently, as envi-
ronmental law enforcement has become surer and better known, many 
corporate enterprises have institutionalized compliance efforts through 
vigorous inspection, self-audits, and organizational redesign. The fact 
that industries generally have moved toward compliance, however, does 
not mean that they also have abandoned their avoidance strategies. 
The odyssey of almost any environmental rule is marked by the 
marketplace placing significant pressures against or within the agency 
drafting the rule, with the goal of decreasing the burden on the regulated 
community. The central rationale of virtually all environmental statutes is 
a legislative recognition of a need to protect parts of the natural and 
civic-societal economies from the excesses of the marketplace economy. 
Statutes typically are launched in a climate of public concern about par-
ticular issues that induces legislatures to promulgate new statutory or 
regulatory systems. Over time, however, the real life practicalities of 
public administration mean that the agencies and their personnel are 
continually forced to operate under the pressure of the marketplace econ-
omy. Through the jungles of lobbying pressure, appropriations commit-
tees, media-managed public opinion, and industry "capture," most agen-
cies find it impossible to maintain the public interest that originally 
launched their regulatory structure as the dominant element in the day-to-
37. In the first session of the 104th Congress, the first appropriations bill passed cut 
the enforcement budget for the EPA by $1.8 billion, thereby cutting nationwide multi-
statutory enforcement by half. See H.R. 2099, 104th Congo (1995) (passed by House of 
Representatives July 2, 1995, but blocked and substantially revised in the Senate). The bill 
also included more than a dozen precisely targeted riders exempting particular industries 
from regulation. See Plater supra note 34, at 754-56; ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY-1995-96 ThACHER'S MAN-
UAL UPDATE 8-30 (1995). 
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day life of its implementation.38 Sometimes the problem is that the legis-
lature itself is captured by the marketplace, as happened during the 104th 
Congress. But even in less dramatic times, most bureaucrats will testify 
that the most sophisticated and insistent pressures they receive come 
from the efforts of marketplace players to diminish the burden of public 
limitations on public or private enterprises. 
This is not to say that environmental law analysis requires a skepti-
cism of the positions taken by industry in every controversy, but merely 
to note the full reality of considerations at play. A thoughtful considera-
tion of three economies produces a deeper and more realistic sense of 
what is going on. 
IV. THE THREE ECONOMIES MODEL APPLIED IN ACTUAL CASES 
Here are some examples, beginning with some relatively simple 
cases, of how expanded consideration of the three different realms can 
clarify what is going on in environmental law. 
A. Natural Resource Damage Evaluation Viewed through the 
Three Economies 
Echoing the public trust doctrine, six federal statutes currently pro-
vide authority for forcing defendant industries and individuals to pay 
"natural resource damages" ("NRD") for the pollution and destruction of 
wildlife and natural systems.39 In the late 1980s the U.S. Department of 
Interior issued rules for NRD assessment that were predominantly based 
upon the market value, if any, of the wildlife concerned. Thus if a pol-
luter killed a million baby striped bass, the damages would be the market 
38. The Atomic Energy Commission ("AEC") became so much a part of the nuclear 
industry that a Congress concerned with protecting humans and the environment from 
radiological dangers felt obliged to split the agency. The AEC was divided into an avow-
edly promotional agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration 
(''ERDA''), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (''NRC'') which was supposed to be 
focused on safety enforcement. See CONGo Q., INC., FEDERAL REGULATORY DIRECTORY 7 
(9th ed. 1994). ERDA was then disbanded in 1977. ld. Critics subsequently have argued 
that the old pressures have reappeared to make the NRC itself less militant. See generally 
Richard .Goldsmith, Regulatory Reform and the Revival of Nile/ear Power, 20 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 159 (1991). 
39. Natural resource damages are authorized by the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0(4)(5) 
(1994); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1994); Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 2702(b)(2)(A) (1994); Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1653 
(1994); National Marine Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1443 (1994); National Park System 
General Authority Act, id. § 19Gj)-(I) (1994 & Supp. IT 1996). Such natural resource dam-
ages were previously assessable under the public trust doctrine and, to some extent, the tort 
of public nuisance. See MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF 
NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (3d ed. 1997). 
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value of the dead fingerling fish at striped bass market rates. If market 
values could not be assigned, for example, to a population of lizard that 
had been destroyed, no damages would be assessed. After reviewing 
these rules, the D.C. Circuit declared that 
it is unreasonable to view market price as the exclusive factor, or 
even the predominant one .... Natural resources have values that 
are not fully captured by the market system.40 
Subsequently, after the court struck down the guidelines, the agency 
was able to promulgate new rules that took fuller account of the values, cu-
mulative impacts, and importance of the natural resources at issue, setting 
values based on cumulative losses to humans as well as to ecosystems 
beyond tangible market values. 
The marketplace had induced the Department of Interior to do its 
natural resource accounting in market terms, but the court, interpreting 
the statutory mandate as a civic objective beyond the marketplace econ-
omy, was able to assert the separate legitimacy of non-market values. 
Today, theories of NRD overtly incorporate resource damage account-
ings, thereby drawing from each of the three different economies. While 
market values remain relevant, so are "contingent-valuation" measures 
based upon subjective, market-intangible human values, and elements 
attempting to incorporate the intrinsic natural "existence" values of 
wildlife and ecosystems.41 
B. Spotted Owls and Old Growth Timber Clearcutting in Federal Ancient 
Forests-Lessons in Politics and Pluralism 
Confrontations between the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") and 
clearcut timber operations in the remaining old growth sectors of national 
forests demonstrate some basic linkages among the three economies, and 
also the associated consequences when regulatory agencies are induced 
to operate primarily within only one economy. 
Over the past decade the small, endangered, and much excoriated 
northern spotted owl has operated as a dramatic legal tripwire under the 
ESA, launching litigation and several injunctions restraining clearcutting 
in the Pacific Northwest.42 The furor over the owl arises from its potential 
to block market operations in the small remaining stands of American old 
40. Ohio v. u.S. Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432,462-64 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
41. See 15 C.F.R. § 990 (1998). See generally Frank B. Coss, Natural Resource 
Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REv. 269 (1989). 
42. See generally Victor M. Sher, Travels with Strix: The Spotted Owl's Journey 
Through the Federal Couns, 14 PUB. LAND L. REv. 41 (1993). 
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growth forests.43 The owl requires an ancient forest habitat, and may be 
rendered extinct if the forests are clearcut. Faced for the first time with 
substantial legal obstacles to cutting the last virgin national forest groves, 
the industry has exerted great political, legal, and media pressures on 
federal agencies and citizen enforcement mechanisms, spotlighting the 
seeming irrationality of protecting the owl.44 The marketplace coalition 
formed to oppose the enforcement of the ESA against the timber industry 
was made up of forest products corporations and their national trade as-
sociations, and the U.S. Forest Service itself (and subsequently has 
spawned several broader major industry coalitions aiming to erode the 
ESA as it applies in other settings as well).4s 
The marketplace resistance confronting the spotted owl comes from 
the threats the owl poses to an extensive program of veiled federal subsi-
dies, as well as straightforward constraints on the sale of lumber and 
woodchips. For generations, the Forest Service has sold timber from na-
tional forests below regular market price and it has built logging roads 
whose combined length is more than eight times that of the interstate 
43. The spotted owl issue is often portrayed in the media as a simple "jobs vs. owls" 
conflict, but the actual tradeoff is more subtle: the historical backdrop is the timber indus-
try's broad-scale clearcutting of private lands and more than two-thirds of the marketable 
public forests, with concomitant inadequate reforestation. Privately owned old growth 
forests have been largely eliminated, replaced with monoculture (single species) tree farms 
that produce less total biomass and have not served to maintain the industry (as well as 
drastically reducing plant and wildlife ecosystem diversity). To maintain their revenues, 
timber companies have sought accelerated endgame cIearcutting efforts on the remaining 
old growth public forests. 
44. The efforts of marketplace players to log the remaining virgin forests in the Na-
tional Forest System are iIIustrated in successful lobbying efforts to eliminate citizen en-
forcement and suspend forest protection laws. A rider to § 318 of the Interior Appropria-
tions Act, for example, achieved statutory non-enforcement by removing jurisdiction for 
citizen challenges. See, e.g., Dep't of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 
of 1990 § 318(g), Pub. L. No. 101-21, 106 Stat. 749 (1989). 
In the so-called "timber salvage" rider attached by timber lobbyists to the Oklahoma 
City Bombing relief bilI, the Forest Service and timber industry were relieved from com-
pliance with virtually all environmental laws that required planning or otherwise prevented 
accelerated cIearcutting in designated national forests. See Emergency Supplemental Ap-
propriations for Additional Disaster. Assistance, for Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, for Assis-
tance in the Recovery from the Tragedy that Occurred at Oklahoma City, and Rescissions 
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-19, 109 Stat. 194,240 (1995). The rider mandated the Forest Service 
and U.S. Bureau of Land Management to award contracts for timber sales, even if the sales 
were below cost to the government. The rider prohibited courts from issuing preliminary 
injunctions with respect to any aspect of timber sales. See generally Congress and Presi-
dent Enact The Most Anti-Environmental Law in History, SAVE AMERICA'S FORESTS, Win-
ter 1995-96; see also Or. Nat. Resources Council v. Jack Ward Thomas, No. 95-6272-HO, 
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19567, at *5 (D. Or. Dec. 5, 1995). 
45. The American Forest and Paper Association supports one of the two major lobbying 
coalitions targeting the ESA. See Am. Forest & Paper Ass'n, Look Who Agrees There's a Bet-
ter Way to Protect Me and My Friends (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.afandpa. 
orglESNsupport.htm>. The other major marketplace coalition targeting the ESA is the Na-
tional Endangered Species Act Reform Council. See Nafl Endangered Species Act Reform 
Coalition (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.nesarc.org>. 
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highway system.46 Additionally, the Service provides other free services 
to the industry,47 pays twenty-five percent of gross timber receipts to local 
communities as payments in lieu of property taxes,48 and helps the in-
dustry resist enforcement of environmental laws that constrain logging. 
Finally, the largest subsidy it facilitates, unaccounted in most economic 
analysis, is an ecological subsidy: the permanent sacrifice of thousands 
of acres of diverse natural forests, often on fragile, high-elevation slopes 
that otherwise would be available for multiple non-logging public uses. 
Marketplace economics create clearcutting practices that impose 
substantial cumulative impacts on the economy of nature and the human 
civic-societal economy. The logging of old-growth forests leads to severe 
erosion, wildlife losses, water quality degradation, a tenfold drop in an 
ecosystem's diversity of species, and other serious long-term natural ef-
fects.49 As these externalities flow into the economy of nature, they in-
herently impact social welfare beyond the realm of the marketplace's 
accounting. Fewer fragile alpine forests remain for recreational and aes-
thetic uses, accelerated erosive runoff from denuded slopes causes in-
creased flooding, and downstream ecosystem effects are drastic. The re-
cent severe losses to the billion-dollar commercial salmon fisheries of the 
Pacific Northwest (primarily attributed to c1earcutting and federal dams) 
is a further example of this effect. For most of these harms the timber 
industry faces no liability in financial terms or otherwise.50 
Thus, to understand the complex realities of the conflicts between 
clearcutting and the endangered spotted owl, one must know much more 
than the owl's own biology and the economics of selling wood products. 
46. See Joel Bourne, At End of the Roads?, AUDUBON MAG., July 1998, at 60. See 
generally Robert E. Wolf, National Forest Timber Sales and the Legacy of Gifford Pinchot: 
Managing a Forest and Making it Pay, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 1037 (1989) (discussing the 
history of the Forest Service and timber sales). 
47. In many cases timber is sold below the Government's own out-of-pocket cash 
flow costs. During the 1980s, the Forest Service sold 124 billion board feet at a loss of 
$3.5 billion. If interest is figured in, this is a loss of $6.3 billion. Other free services by the 
Forest Service besides providing logging roads include surveying and inventorying tim-
berlands, fire protection, staff personnel and structures, mapmaking, and disease control. 
Under cost-accounting analysis, most of the 122 national forests have never earned a penny 
on timber; in 1990 only 15 showed a cash flow profit. See Perri Knize, The Mismanage-
ment of the National Forests, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1991, at 98-101. 
48. In 1996 this amounted to $327 million. See The Thoreau Institute, National For-
est Timber Sales and Receipts and Costs in 1996, 14 DIFFERENT DRUMMER S-3 1998). The 
theory of these payments is that the federal government ought to contribute because it is 
exempt from state and local property taxation. The Forest Service does not account for 
these and many other public costs in calculating net revenues. 
49. See Steve Young, Tree Slaughter: Your Taxes at Work, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 
1989, at B3; Tom Barlow, Evolution of the National Forest Management Act, & ENVTL. L. 
539 (1978). The spotted owl turns out to be a vivid ecological indicator of ecosystem val-
ues, some of which have human consequences as well. 
50. As an additional human consequence, the owl actually serves to strengthen 
available employment opportunities. The alternative mode to clearcutting is selective 
grading and cutting of forests, which can result in an increase of forest jobs. The issue is 
thus not ''jobs vs. owls" but "owls for full employment." 
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The environmental laws invoked in this controversy understandably 
awakened an empassioned backlash from the marketplace.51 Yet they also 
provided a forum for legal consideration of the complex ecology of the 
forest region, and of the marketplace's impact on societal values and its 
consequences for humans and natural systems. As so often happens in 
environmental cases, the protection of natural values (in this case saving 
a species from extinction) serves human utilitarian ends as well. The 
spotted owl is a living indicator of the old-growth ecosystem's unparal-
leled biodiversity, of the natural systems' declining health, and of the 
dysfunctional human consequences that flow from that decline. Endan-
gered species operate as barometers of threatened values for humans in 
the civic-societal economy.52 
The clash among three economies in the spotted owl cases also il-
lustrates another frequent element of modern environmental practice-
the cooptation of regulatory agencies into the marketplace economy. 
Agencies that are responsible for implementing the statutory mandates 
for protecting values within the natural and civic-societal economies of-
ten are taken over by the very forces they were intended to constrain. As 
discussed in Part ill of this Article, the "capture" phenomenon chroni-
cled by political scientists is a frequent reality in environmental agencies. 
Sadly the U.S. Forest Service is a classic example of this phenomenon.53 
Distinguishing the three economies also emphasizes the important 
strategic role of citizens in environmental law enforcement, and the 
significant new pluralism in modern governance. Citizen enforcement has 
shaped the development of most of the major federal environmental 
regulatory structures.54 The evolution of ESA enforcement was heavily 
51. The law school clinic that brought a number of these cases faced ethical and 
financial challenges catalyzed by the forest products industry. The University of Oregon 
faced appropriations and other political censures, and ultimately, while the academic por-
tion of the clinic remains on campus, litigation is now conducted independently of the 
University. See Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. & Steven P. Solow, Environmental Litigation as 
Clinical Education: A Case Study, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 319, 321, 321 n.4 (1994). 
52. See generally Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Embattled Social Utilities of the Endan-
gered Species Act-A Noah Presumption and Caution Against Putting Gasmasks on the 
Canaries in the Coal Mine, 27 ENVTL. L. 847 (1997). 
53. See PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 397. Besides the Forest Service, frequent 
targets of the capture criticism are the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the National Marine 
Fisheries Service, the Soil Conservation Service, the Federal Highway Administration, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Bureau 
of Land Management, the Bureau of Reclamation, and a number of regulatory offices 
within the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
54. VIrtually all of the major pollution statutes, with the possible exception of toxics 
regulations, were shaped and pressed into active enforcement by the pressures of citizen 
litigation. An appellate history of the CAA, CWA, NEPA, Toxic Substances Control Act 
("TSCA"), FlFRA, ESA and other major federal statutes reflects the strategic efforts of 
environmental citizen groups to force the government further to define, develop and im-
plement the legislated statutory protections. Without the citizen enforcement provisions of 
the statutes or the efforts of the major environmental law citizens associations, most of 
these programs would probably have continued to languish under the political constraints 
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influenced by a series of citizen actions on the spotted owl and the snail 
darter.55 
Citizen enforcement provides a necessary catalytic supplement to 
inertia and cooptation in the traditional "bi-polar" regulatory format of 
civic governance. In this model the marketplace is the dominant societal 
system, with government agencies and programs deployed by legislatures 
to administer corrections for market failure. The three economies model 
illustrates the shift to "multi-polar" pluralism in public law. Citizen envi-
ronmental suits typically are motivated by desires to protect the natural 
world or civic values, and they attempt to force agency implementation to 
be guided by the objectives in the latter two economies for which the 
statutes were originally promulgated. Agencies created to serve the civic-
societal and natural economies are regularly suborned by the marketplace 
economy; environmental citizen suits encourage agencies to serve all 
three. The functional necessities of modern governance reflected in envi-
ronmental law are increasingly echoed in pluralizing trends in govern-
ment processes in other fields both here and abroad. Such trends include 
heightened transparency, anticipatory factfinding and alternatives analy-
sis (as in environmental impact statements), enhanced public accounting, 
mUlti-party decisional processes, and retrospective performance analyses. 
C. The Delaney Clause Controversy: The Law and Economics of 
Three Economies 
The construct of three economies does not produce simplified an-
swers for difficult questions of societal balancing, but only clarifies that 
governmental answers must consider more than one economic realm. 
of the marketplace. Only in the case of the toxics statutes does agency initiative appear to 
have been self-motivating, perhaps because the field of toxics regulation is so charged with 
active political concern. 
The major legal foundation for this pluralistic citizen enforcement phenomenon, be-
sides enhanced participation in agency rulemaking, is the citizen standing provision found 
in many environmental statutes. Drawing on the experience of the civil rights era, the 
drafters of dozens of new and amended environmental statutes in the 1970s authorized 
suits by citizen attorneys general. In a quintessentially American move-now being copied 
by European and other international legal systems-these statutes give citizens standing to 
enforce federal law by filing a sixty-day notice letter. See, e.g., TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 
(1994); ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 
30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1994); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1427 
(1994); CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 
id. § 1415(g) (1994); Deepwater Port Act, id. § 1515 (1994); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4911 (1994); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, id. § 6305 (1994); RCRA, id. § 6972 
(1994); CAA, id. § 7604 (1994); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, ld. 8435 (1994); 
Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act, id. § 9124 (1994); Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a) (1994). Fee-shifting provisions further encourage citizen en-
forcement by allowing citizen plaintiffs who have prevailed in whole or part to recover 
expert witnesses' and attorneys' fees. 
55. See generally Sher, supra note 42; Plater, supra note 52. 
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The fascinating environmental law controversy over the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA")' s Delaney Clause was a milestone in na-
tional debates about risk assessment, law-and-economics, the virtues of a 
draconian statutory standard, and political questions about regulators' 
ability to stand up to regulated interests. 
The Delaney Clause, Section 409 of the FDCA, added to the Act in 
1958, prescribed that: 
No additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce can-
cer when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests 
which are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food addi-
tives, to induce cancer in man or animal. 56 
This legislation represented a fearful congressional response to initial 
revelations of the risks posed by human exposure to hazardous chemicals. 
The Delaney Clause's skepticism about the marketplace's ability to insure 
safety against chemical exposures presaged the message of Rachel Carson's 
Silent Spring, identifying potentially harmful and widespread effects of 
agricultural pesticides to the health of natural systems and humans.57 
By the late 1980s, however, scientists were able to detect chemicals 
with increasing accuracy, and there was an explosion of new knowledge 
about hazardous compounds and the statistical probabilities of their harm 
thresholds. As a result, some observers began to view the Delaney Clause 
as a crude, blunt instrument left over from a more primitive era. 
The marketplace economy understandably resisted restrictions on 
pesticides. Commercial pesticides are profitable products and very effec-
tive at killing insects that damage crops.58 Under pressure from industries 
56. 21 U.S.C.A. § 348(c)(3) (1958). 
57. See CARSON, supra note 13. 
This soil community, then, consists of a web of interwoven lives, each in some 
way related to the others-the living creatures depending on the soil, but the 
soil in tum a vital element of the earth only so long as this community within 
it flourishes .... What happens to these incredibly numerous and vitally nec-
essary inhabitants of the soil when poisonous chemicals are carried down into 
their world ... borne on the rain that has picked up a lethal contamination as it 
filters through the leaf canopy of forest and orchard cropland? Is it reasonable 
to suppose that we can apply a broad-spectrum insecticide to kill the burrow-
ing larval stages of a crop-destroying insect, for example, without also killing 
the "good" insects whose function may be the essential one of breaking down 
matter? 
[d. at 56. '. 
Building from the effects of pesticides on soil communities, Carson chronicled the 
cumulative risks to other parts of natural systems, and ultimately predicted threats extend-
ing to humans and human economics that have become all too real. See id.; see also COL-
BORN ET AL., supra note 11. 
58. The statutory provision embodied the so-called Delaney Paradox: its restrictions 
applied to food "additives," and primarily impacted pesticide residues within processed 
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seeking to circumvent the Delaney Clause, pitched debates began in the 
corridors of Congress and in various agencies. 
When industry, in this case the agricultural chemical industry, at-
tacks a provision of public interest law, it casts its message in public-
oriented terms such as diminished food quality, reduced availability of 
nutritious foods, increased food costs, and other risks to the public,59 not 
in terms that "profits should override safety concerns." The market-
place's public-oriented arguments, however, are often solid and rational. 
A principal challenge of environmental law is to determine where the 
rational balance should be drawn in making societal decisions, weighing 
the public merits of all three economies.6O 
In the Delaney Clause debates, a powerful law-and-economics ar-
gument emerged, based on a rational cost-benefit-alternatives analysis of 
regulatory restrictions on carcinogenic pesticides. The marketplace inter-
ests correctly noted that application of the Delaney Clause produced 
many anomalous results in public interest terms. Since the Clause for-
bade any carcinogenic pesticide residue additives, it prohibited the use of 
safer, ever-so-slightly carcinogenic pesticides, while increasing the use of 
much more hazardous non-carcinogenic pesticides.61 There were also 
foods, while in some cases raw foods containing the same pesticide residues were allowed 
to be sold for human consumption. In fact, the criterion of concentration level in processed 
foods may bear little or no relation to actual risk of cancer, and some pesticides could be 
barred by rigid enforcement of the Delaney Clause while others, with greater cancer-
causing risk, could be permitted because they do not concentrate in processed foods. See 
COMM. ON SCIENTIFIC & REGULATORY ISSUES UNDERLYING PESTICIDE USE PATTERNS AND 
AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION, REGULATING PESTICIDES IN FOOD: THE DELANEY PARADOX 
40-44 (1987). 
59. 
The reduced number of effective pesticides will disrupt agricultural produc-
tion, diminish food quality, increase food costs, and reduce the availability of 
nutritious fruit, vegetable, and grain products .... The risk to the public will 
be increased by forcing EPA to ban beneficial pesticides that pose de minimis 
cancer risks and requiring the substitution of pesticides posing greater health 
risks which are not associated with cancer .... 
Clausen Ely, The Delaney Clause: An Obscure EPA Policy Is to Blame, EPA J., Jan. 1993, 
at 44-45 (writing as an attorney representing the National Food Processors Association). 
60. That is, the arguments made by marketplace actors to reinforce their individual 
interests, which often have the power to dominate decisional processes, must nevertheless 
be evaluated in terms of their public, not private, merits, while giving full consideration to 
the merits of arguments supporting the other economies' interests which typically are far 
more difficult to marshall and bring to bear in the political process. 
61. The EPA came to hold this view: 
EPA believes that [strict] interpretation of the Delaney Clause could adversely 
affect the nation's food supply by making it difficult for farmers to use the 
safest pesticides on their crops. [EPA's] policy of applying a "negligible risk" 
standard across the board to all potentially carcinogenic pesticides [would] 
produce a more "enlightened" scheme than does a literal interpretation of the 
Delaney clause [which] precludes any risklbenefit analysis where even the ti-
niest risk of cancer is involved .... Our goal must be to bring U.S. pesticide 
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substantial doubts whether chemicals that caused cancer when given in 
large doses to mice, rats, and other non-human forms of life accurately 
depicted risks of cancer to humans. Hence, through a careful overall risk-
benefit analysis, some of the pesticides containing trace amounts of car-
cinogenic materials appeared to be far preferable to the alternatives that 
had to be used under a strict interpretation of the Delaney Clause. Essen-
tially incorporating a careful law-and-economics risk-benefit analysis, 
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") issued administrative 
rules in October 1988 announcing its new interpretation of the Delaney 
Clause: the EPA would permit some cancer-causing pesticide residues in 
processed foods so long as the particular substances posed only a "de 
minimis" risk of actually causing cancer.62 
The Natural Resources Defense Council citizen law firm ("NRDC") 
filed suit, arguing that the statutory language required the strict exclusion 
of carcinogenic pesticides that cumulated in processed foods, leaving no 
room for administrative re-interpretation to evade the statutory command. 
The NRDC argued that: 
The reality of life is that we are exposed to a multiplicity of toxic 
substances .... For this reason, ultimately, the overall policy un-
derlying the Delaney Clause-that we should avoid unnecessary 
and involuntary exposure to cancer-causing agents-remains as 
valid today as when enacted . . . . During the Reagan administra-
tion, in describing dietary risk, the former Director of EPA's Pesti-
cide Program said, "Pesticides dwarf the other environmental risks 
the Agency deals with, [even] toxic waste dumps .... "63 
In Les v. Reilly the Ninth Circuit agreed with the NRDC, holding that 
"the language of the Delaney clause, its history and purpose all reflect 
that Congress intended the EPA to prohibit all additives that are carcino-
regulation into conformity with current science and ensure that the nation's 
pesticide safety laws provide the best available protection to consumers .••. 
The current framework is illogical in that it results in opposite outcomes for 
pesticides having similar risks, benefits, costs, and efficacy. 
Victor J. Kimm, The Delaney Clause Dilemma, EPA J., Jan. 1993, at 39-41 (writing as the 
head of EPA's pesticide bureau); see also Richard A. Merrill, FDA's Implementation of 
the Delaney Clause: Repudiation of Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Sci-
entific Progress?, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 87 (1988) (concluding that the Delaney clause was 
both unambiguous and unwise, "at once an explicit and imprudent expression of legislative 
will"). 
62. See Regulation of Pesticides in Food: Addressing the Delaney Paradox, 53 Fed. 
Reg. 41,104, 41,110 (1988). 
63. See AI Meyerhoff, Let's Refonn a Failed Food Safety Regime, EPA J., Jan. 1993, 
at 42-43 (writing as NRDC's lead attorney). 
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gens, regardless of the degree of risk involved."64 The Ninth Circuit fur-
ther held that, 
the EPA in effect asks us to approve what it deems to be a more en-
lightened system than that which Congress established .... Revis-
ing the existing statutory scheme, however, is neither our function 
nor the function of the EPA .... If there is to be a change, it is for 
Congress to direct.65 
As the judges anticipated, Les v. Reilly sharpened the debate about 
the "absolutism" of the legislation's language and ultimately produced a 
congressional override of the Delaney Clause. In the Food Quality Pro-
tection Act of 1996, Congress chose to amend the provision, shifting to a 
"negligible risk" risk assessment approach.66 In a heavily debated bar-
gain, environmental groups like NRDC reluctantly agreed to give up the 
strict enforceability of the Delaney Clause insofar as pesticide residues 
were concerned, to be replaced with the agency-defined standard of "rea-
sonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure."67 
D. The Lessons of Three Economies Reflected in the Actual Cases 
What does a consideration of the three economies reveal in these 
foregoing classic environmental law narratives? 
Debates are typically cast in civic-societal terms. Although the pres-
sure to change the law comes from profit-maximizing marketplace players, 
when the debate is brought into public view, it is resolutely centered within 
the civic-societal interest, especially human health, with only an indirect 
backdrop of market costs. The concerns posed by pesticides to the econ-
omy of nature did not figure into the Delaney debate, eclipsed by civic 
concerns of human health. The linkage between civic-societal interests 
and the economy of nature was perhaps not sufficiently perceptible. 
Similarly, in the case of the spotted owl, the industry couched its argu-
ments in terms of jobs rather than its concerns for maximizing the bot-
tom-line. 
The multiple roles of law-and-economics. As revealed in the De-
laney Clause story, law-and-economics has developed multiple person-
64. 968 F.2d 985, 986 (9th Cir. 1992). 
65. ld. at 990. 
66. Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489, (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994 & 
Supp. II 1996)). 
67. "Aggregate exposure" was inclusively re-defined, to include monitoring of all 
forms of cumulative human exposure. The health of children was established as the base-
line against which the "reasonable certainty of no harm" standard is to be applied. The 
Delaney clause remains in effect with regard to other food additives. 
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alities. On one hand, when law-and-economics serves as a means rather 
than an end, it has evident contributions to make to the formulation of 
particular public policies, and in crafting effective implementation 
mechanisms. Thus, while cost-benefit analysis is not a complete rubric 
for public policymaking, it is a valuable part of such decisions, especially 
if it incorporates "shadowpricing" and other economic valuation tech-
niques beyond market pricing. Further, by enlisting marketplace tech-
niques, regulators are often able to achieve desired levels of compliance 
at lower cost and greater efficiency.68 If, on the other hand, law-and-
economics succeeds in establishing the premise that the marketplace is 
the optimal determinant of societal policy, then the civic-societal econ-
omy and the economy of nature will be lost in that narrowed perspective. 
The chronic role of uncertainty. In environmental law there is al-
ways the danger that important knowledge about indirect causations and 
attenuated consequences is lacking. The Precautionary Principle has be-
come an internationally recognized environmental axiom because dislo-
cations in the civic-societal economy and the economy of nature so often 
result from actions in the marketplace for which consequences are in-
sufficiently known or considered.69 As the NRDC argued, 
The essential premise of the Delaney Clause ... is as simple as it is 
powerful: What we understand best about carcinogens is the limited 
extent of our knowledge. [The] clause is grounded in a policy of 
prevention: prohibiting the addition of carcinogens in the food sup-
ply to prevent avoidable cancers in humans .... Since the Delaney 
Clause became law, much new scientific knowledge has been devel-
oped. Yet we still do not know whether humans are more or less 
sensitive than experimental animals to various carcinogens. We 
don't know how to assess the contribution of one carcinogen in re-
lation to the impacts of exposures to other carcinogens. We don't 
know the cumulative impact of dozens of carcinogens now permit-
ted in the food supply. We should, therefore, follow Rachel Car-
son's advice .... "The ultimate answer is to use less toxic chemi-
68. The term "market-enlisting" rather than "market-based" regulation seems pref-
erable because it clarifies that operative goals are to be set by the governmental process 
rather than by market mechanisms themselves. The term "market-enlisting" encompasses 
the range of innovative new devices-bubbles, netting, offsets, banking, tradable emission 
permit allocations, and the like-that have developed to supplement the old command-and-
control regulatory systems. PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 745-62. 
69. See, e.g., Principle 15, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. 
A1Conf.15115IRev.1 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 874, 879. This logic has led to the proliferation 
around the world of the American concept of environmental impact statements, a societally 
oriented looking-before-we-leap that is counter-intuitive to private and public entrepre-
neurs. This concept also is in Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration. See id. 
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cals, [rejecting] this system of deliberately poisoning our food and 
then policing the result."70 
When Congress allowed some carcinogenic pesticide residues in 
food products, it took a calculated risk that perhaps could have been 
avoided.71 
Environmental regulation is best when achieved through pluralism. 
As the spotted owl and the NRD regulation aptly demonstrate, the public 
interest in complex issues cannot be entrusted solely to the discretion of 
the marketplace. Like the logic of biodiversity in ecology, environmental 
law repeatedly shows that multi-polar processes involving citizen groups 
and other representatives of the latter two economies are more reliable 
than bi-polar governance. In cases beginning at least as early as the effort 
to save Storm King Mountain,72 and continuing through modern cases 
like the spotted owl litigation, environmental law has relied on citizens' 
lawsuits and administrative challenges to pressure ~eluctant agencies to 
enforce the requirements of public interest statutes. 
In these circumstances citizen participation in shaping and applying 
environmental laws continues to be critical. The NRDC and other citizen 
groups fearful of pesticide carcinogens in food were no doubt leery of a 
statutory amendment that left the definition of permissible residues up to 
the discretionary judgments of agencies, whose decisions by virtue of 
their discretionary character would be practically unassailable because of 
judicial deference in court reviews of agency action. If public protection 
can vary substantially with the changing discretionary agendas of se-
quential administrations, provisions protecting the public and natural 
welfare are distressingly vulnerable.73 
The dilemma of clear but crude standards. Sometimes protections 
for the economy of nature and the civic-societal economy require stark 
public law commands rather than subtle discretionary balances. The di-
lemma posed by the Delaney Clause is that a stark statutory provision 
may start to look outdated in the minds of many fair-minded observers. 
In a number of cases its commands are over-inclusive, and under-
sensitive to the rational public policy subtleties of the issue. Suppose that 
70. Meyerhoff, supra note 63, at 42-43. 
71. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (dis-
cussing Secretary's statutory duty to consider feasible alternatives). 
72. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 
608 (2d Cir. 1965). This case, in which citizens blocked a major pumped-storage project 
that would have gutted the scenic Storm King Mountain in the Hudson River valley, gave 
birth to several environmental advocacy groups, and established the concept of private 
attorneys-general as an important strategy for American environmental protection. 
73. Worries that the amendment's delegation of virtually unchallengeable agency 
discretion to determine a "reasonable certainty [of] no harm" would permit erosions of 
strict health standards were reinforced by subsequent FDA policy declarations by Clinton 
Administration officials that some of the amended Act's health-based requirements are 
discretionary rather than mandatory. 
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an environmental advocacy group knows that the agency in charge of 
enforcing a discretionary standard would be vulnerable to political pres-
sure from the regulated industry. What is an environmental group to do 
then, especially in cases where many experts outside the industry affirm 
that a stark prohibition may be logically inconsistent and poor public 
policy? An intricate balancing process for setting standards for a wide 
array of substances cannot be done case-by-case in Congress. Such stan-
dard setting must be delegated to an administrative agency, and there the 
whole statutory mandate can be lost to the cupidity of the political mar-
ketplace within the agency process. This is a dilemma regularly faced by 
public interest groups. 
On the other hand, clear statutory commands efficiently sidestep 
much of the slippage encountered by other restrictions on the market-
place economy, because they leave little wiggle room and subject both 
regulators and regulatees to a tougher level of judicial supervision. 
Crude, simple commands are more likely to be obeyed by regula tees and 
regulators alike. As in the Delaney Clause case, environmental law often 
presents a dilemma between optimal substantive theory and tactical re-
alities, and its resolution requires acknowledgment that often both sides 
may be right. Given the imbalances between the contending economies, 
the interests of the civic-societal economy and the economy of nature 
may often require relatively blunt legal instruments that, despite their 
inefficiencies, are necessary to support significant citizen enforcement. 74 
The analytical construct of three economies is a useful tool in a 
wide variety of instances. The World Trade Organization and other inter-
national trade compacts, for example, have begun applying market-based 
standards in judging the acceptability of domestic food safety and envi-
ronmental regulations. This trend can undercut governmental protections 
of the economy of nature and civic-societal interests.7s The debate over 
the amendment of the ESA regularly forces groups interested in protect-
ing species for natural and societal reasons to defend and justify them-
selves in market terms.76 This is precisely what Justice Scalia required of 
coastal regulations in Lucas- v. South Carolina Coastal Council.77 The 
problem is similarly reflected in coastal fisheries regulations which are 
74. The Endangered Species Act's restrictions on federal agency actions, for in-
stance, would probably have been unenforceable if they had been couched in tenns of bal-
ancing instead of stark prohibitions. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1998); Hill v. Tenn. Valley 
Auth., 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
75. See, e.g., David A. Wirth, International Trade Agreements: Vehicles for Regu-
latory Refonn?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 331 (examining the impact of international trade 
agreements on domestic environmental regulations). 
76. The aim of several proposed amendments to the ESA is to provide for market-
based compromises of species protections. Habitat conservation plans can offer potentially 
beneficial accomodations, but also raise risks that market pressures will override ecological 
considerations in their initial negotiation and subsequent implementation. See generally 
Plater, supra note 52. 
77. See generally Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), supra note 16. 
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implemented in terms that give dominant weight to destructive market 
tendencies,78 and in the systemic chemical contaminations which now 
persist widely in ecosystems and human metabolism.79 The modem over-
emphasis on marketplace factors dangerously ignores the warning signs 
provided by the other two economies. 
v. SUMMARY: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS 
When environmental law burst onto the scene around the time of the 
first Earth Day in 1970, many observers declared that it was just a: fad. 
The new field, however, addressed significant realities and needs of soci-
ety, and quickly has become an established sector of the legal system of 
great breadth and technical complexity. 
The practice, theory, and syncretic linkages of environmental law 
have become so substantial that any curriculum that ignores the field is 
likely to be regarded as gravely lacking. In response, law schools have 
evolved a range of compromises for translating the complexity and vol-
ume of the field into the academic curriculum. Many conceptual,chal-
lenges remain, however, in understanding and processing the vast sprawl 
of the field. Academics deploy a broad array of methodologies and ide-
ologies to get a handle on environmental law and typically find, as the 
First Law of Ecology would have it, that everything is connected to eve-
rything else. 
No matter what approach or ideology one applies to the field, it is 
realistic and helpful to conceptualize environmental law as an important 
field of societal governance existing in three different but interconnected 
"economies." Environmental law is not a mere ameliorative overlay on 
the marketplace economy. In the realm of the civic-societal economy, it 
has taken on the task of protecting and advancing under-served and long-
78. In the territorial waters of the United States, the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration ("NOAA"), through regional fisheries councils, attempts to set 
maximum quotas in order to protect sustainable populations of commercial fish for future 
generations of fishermen and consumers. The pressure of industry upon NOAA and the 
agency's consequent laxity in enforcing conservation regulations, however, are notorious. 
Even though the depredations of over-fishing undercut the marketplace's own long-term 
interests, the short-term logic of the drive to maximize profits powerfully undercuts gov-
ernmental regulations. In dealing with the New England ground fisheries, for example, the 
agency was systematically unable to prevent an obviously declining downward spiral of 
haddock, flounder, halibut, and similar ground fish until populations crashed. When the 
agency attempted to set a numerical quota for "total allowable catch" (''TAC''), the politi-
cal backlash was so great that the agency redefined the TAC to be whatever the amount was 
that fisherman actually caught. Besides dropping quotas, the regulation also dropped limits 
on the number of fishing trips that boats could make, substituting instead minimum net size 
restrictions that traditionally are virtually impossible to enforce. See 1982 Groundfish 
Management Plan Amendments of New England Regional Fisheries Council, 47 Fed. Reg. 
43,705 (1982). 
79. See generally COLBORN ET AL., supra note 11. 
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term interests of human society. In the realm of the economy of nature, it 
calls attention to and preserves the mechanisms of the intricately struc-
tured natural systems that support life on the planet. Recognizing the 
overlapping yet distinct realms of the latter two economies forces aware-
ness of realities which otherwise get eclipsed by and absorbed into the 
marketplace economy's dominance of modem governance. 
Sustainable environmental law requires a straightforward acknow-
ledgement of constant inherent tensions between public values and the 
dynamic structures of the marketplace economy. The marketplace econ-
omy is the most pervasive and powerful social and political mechanism 
in modem governance. It has the ability to achieve not only great mate-
rial productivity but also efficient and beneficial accomodations with 
public values. Yet this powerful political and economic marketplace 
based on individualized interests consistently tends to resist the imposi-
tion and implementation of public values. The 104th Congress was only 
the most dramatic recent manifestation of this reality. A basic function of 
environmental law and of government must be to assure that the short-
and long-term interests of society at large, and the natural systems of the 
planet in which human society will have to make its future, are substan-
tially factored into the structures of societal governance. 
Too often, as in the timber debates, public policymaking is pres-
sured to adopt the relatively uncritical "pragmatic," short-sighted dictates 
of the marketplace. True economic analysis must incorporate a compre-
hensive review of total social impacts. The analysis cannot be merely the 
sum total of all the cost-externalizing private self-interests in the market-
place. Instead, it must include cumulative inputs and impacts to human 
civic existence, present and future. Because natural systems are of such 
importance to the civic-societal economy-in terms of resources supplied 
and perturbances passed on-a full economic accounting must also con-
sider consequences to the economy of nature. 
A perceptive awareness of pervasive politics of resistance and cir-
cumvention in the dominant marketplace economy is necessary to the 
understanding of environmental law controversies and to guide the 
crafting of balances and accomodations that do justice to the less power-
ful but ultimately more important civic-societal economy and the econ-
omy of nature. Environmental law can no longer be dismissed as the ex-
tension of a fad or generational idiosyncrasy. It is about the life and gov-
ernance of society over time. Scratch the surface of almost any environ-
mental law issue and one will find the fundamental issues of modem de-
mocracy. 
